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of discretion. It is capable of abuse. It is in the stream of in-
culpation. Cross-examination can play only a limited role in off-
setting false inference or misleading coincidence from a 'stacked'
handwriting exemplar.26 2
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that it is "an abuse
of the grand jury process for the Government to impose on that body
to perform investigative work that can be, and heretofore has been,
successfully accomplished by the regular investigation agencies of Gov-
erment."26
3
In short, the Second Circuit has provided law enforcement agen-
cies with a new evidence-gathering tool. Perhaps, as the Ninth Circuit
has held,264 the more fundamental question that should be answered
is whether the witness (potential defendant) is being afforded due pro-
cess of law. The degree of unreliability of handwriting samples and the
potential abuse that this may engender present serious constitutional
doubts. Our system of justice should not tolerate any procedure which
may so readily undermine basic constitutional protections.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL - Kirby DISTINGUISHED
Saltys v. Adams
The Second Circuit recently demonstrated its reluctance to follow
the spirit of the Supreme Court's latest ruling on the sixth amendment
right to assistance of counsel. Earlier this year, a plurality of the Su-
preme Court, in Kirby v. Illinois,265 held that "a person's sixth and
fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
262 Id. at 292 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
263 In re Mara, 454 F.2d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1971).
264 In United States v. Dinsio, No. 72-2413 (9th Cir., Sept. 15, 1972); the court opined:
[Mjodest breaches of grand jury secrecy may well be required when nondisclosure
would defeat fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to due process
of law.
Slip opinion at 3. The Seventh Circuit has also decided that fifth amendment due process
considerations are "needed to protect citizens from infringement of their Fourth Amend-
ment rights through abuse of the grand jury process." 454 F.2d at 584.
265 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Kirby was stopped and asked to produce identification by
police who thought he was a suspect wanted for an unrelated offense. Kirby was carrying
travelers' checks and a social security card bearing the name Shard. He was arrested when
he could not satisfactorily explain his possession of these items. Upon arrival at the station
house, the police learned that one Shard had been robbed the day before. At the police
station and again at trial, Kirby was identified by Shard as one of the robbers. At the
time of the station house identification, no formal proceedings had been initiated, no
attorney was present and Kirby had not been advised of any right to counsel. Kirby was
convicted and appealed on the grounds that the identification confrontation violated his
sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel.
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him."26 In Saltys v. Adams,287 the court of appeals directed the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of "woefully inadequate"
representation by counse 268 but, more significantly, for the purpose of
granting habeas corpus relief, it resuscitated the "critical stage" test2 9
of United States v. Wade,270 Gilbert v. California,-7' and Stovall v.
266 Id. at 688.
267 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972). Petitioner Saltys, while awaiting arraignment on an un-
related charge, was identified as a participant in a West Hartford, Connecticut, drug store
robbery by the clerk present at the time of the holdup. Immediately after identifying
Saltys as "resembling" the robber on the basis of mugshots, the clerk and a friend present
at the robbery were "walked through" the "bullpen" where Saltys was awaiting arraign-
ment. They immediately identified the petitioner as a perpetrator of the holdup and later
that day reaffirmed their identification at "viewings" of the petitioner in the "bullpen" and
also in a glass-endosed detention area in the Hartford Circuit Court. At no time was the
petitioner or his attorney (retained to defend the unrelated charge) notified of the identi-
fication sessions. Saltys was convicted of robbery in state court and instituted federal habeas
corpus proceedings after a state writ was denied. The District Court for the District of
Connecticut denied the application.
268 By virtue of what we consider "woefully inadequate" . . . representation, key
objectionable evidence, without which Saltys in all probability could not have
been convicted, was admitted without objection. It was then strengthened, or at
least expanded on, by an ill-advised cross-examination. With resultant prejudice,
counsel's omissions here justify reversal.
465 F.2d at 1029 (citations omitted). See note 29 infra.
269 The Supreme Court has never been overly concerned with setting an exact point
in time at which the right to counsel attaches. For example, the Court has said that the
accused "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him." Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
463 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 87 (1932).
The Court has used phrases such as "critical period" or "critical stage" to describe
the time at which the right to assistance of counsel attaches. See Coleman v. Alabama,
supra at 9; Stovall v. Denno, 388 US. 293, 298 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
272 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 227 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam); Hamilton v. Alabama, 868 U.S. 52, 53 (1961); Powell v.
Alabama, supra at 57. In United States v. Wade, supra, the Court declined to fix a
"critical stage" at any one point in time but declared that the accused "need not stand
alone at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial." 388 U.S. at 226. The
Court emphasized its willingness to "scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused
to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's
basic right to a fair trial ...." Id. at 227 (emphasis in original).
A year later, in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968), the Court
explained that the rationale of Wade-Gilbert "was that an accused is entitled to counsel
at any 'critical stage of the prosecution' and that a post-indictment line-up is such a
'critical stage"' (emphasis added).
Even prior to Wade-Gilbert-Stovall, the Court, in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did in fact extend to the accused the
right to assistance of counsel prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. The
Escobedo Court indicated that it would not fix a "critical stage" at any particular point
in time: "It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel ... depend on
whether at the time of the interrogation the authorities had secured a formal indictment."
378 US. at 486. The Kirby plurality characterized these cases as "deviations" and declared
that they were directed toward the fifth amendment right to counsel. 406 U.S. at 689. But
see note 276 infra.
270 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
271388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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Denno272 as to the time of accrual of the sixth amendment right to
assistance of counsel.
An individual's right to the assistance of counsel springs from two
separate and distinct constitutional sources- the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment 273 and the assistance of counsel clause of
the sixth amendment,274 both of which are applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.275 The rights to counsel acknowl-
edged by the two amendments have, to a large degree, evolved inde-
pendently.276 However, intensive case law development over the last
decade has clouded the extent to which the rights granted by the
amendments overlap with respect to the time at which they accrue.
In Miranda v. Arizona,277 the Court held that the fifth amendment
right attaches when the police attempt to investigate a suspect "after
... [he] has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way. '2 78 The Court characterized this
confrontation between police and accused as the "point that our ad-
versary system of criminal proceedings commences .... ,,279
In United States v. Wade,210 on the other hand, the Court con-
strued the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel to apply to
"critical stages of the proceedings," 28' which the Court defined as "any
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial. ' 28 2 While the event under consideration in Wade took place after
the indictment had been returned, the Court indicated a willingness to
scrutinize "any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine
272 588 U.S. 293 (1967).
273 U.S. CONSr. amend. V: "... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .. " In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966), the Court
stated: "Mhe right to have counsel present at the interogation is indispensable to the
protection of the fifth amendment privilege under the system we delineate today."
274 U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
275 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (self-incrimination clause); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel clause).
276 In the course of deciding "fifth amendment" cases, the Court has used sixth
amendment language. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 US. 478, 491 (1964). In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967), the Court
stated: "[N]othing decided or said in the opinions in the cited cases [Miranda and
Escobedo] links the right to counsel only to protection of Fifth Amendment rights."
277 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
278 Id. at 444.
279 Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
280 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
281 Id. at 224. See note 269 supra.
282 Id. at 226. See note 269 supra.
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whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the de-
fendant's basic right to a fair trial...."2s-
In Kirby v. Illinois,2" however, a plurality of the Court285 severely
limited the Wade "critical stage" test by holding that a person's sixth
amendment right to assistance of counsel attaches "only at or after the
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him."28 The Court offered "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment, information, or arraignment" as examples. 287
The event common to Wade-Gilbert-Stovall, Kirby and Saltys was
an in-person identification of a suspect by a victim or witness, generally
referred to as a "lineup" or "showup.' 2s8 Despite the fact that the
Court has characterized this identification procedure as a critical stage
"peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors
which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial,"29 if
the identification takes place before the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings, under the Kirby rule the accused is not entitled to assis-
tance of counsel under the sixth amendment.
While in custody pending arraignment on an unrelated charge,
petitioner Saltys was, without notice to his attorney, personally identi-
288 Id. at 227 (emphasis in original).
284 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
285 The plurality opinion was written by Justice Stewart, who was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Powell concurred only in the
result. Id. at 682.
286 Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
287Id. at 689. Under federal rules, a complaint institutes a criminal proceeding in the
federal courts. See generally FED. R. Cant. P. 3-9; 8 J. MooRE, FEDEMAL PRAtCE 3.02
(2d ed. 1972); 8A id. at 44.02.
In the states comprising the Second Circuit, the statutory provisions are essentially
similar. In New York, "[a] criminal action ... commences with the filing of an accusatory
instrument against a defendant in a criminal court .... " N.Y. Caw. PRo. Lcsw § 1.20(15)
(McKinney 1971). The statute defines "accusatory instrument" as an indictment, informa-
tion or complaint. See id. at § 1.20(1).
The Connecticut statutes offer no exact point of commencement of criminal proceed-
ings but commentary indicates that the filing of an information or complaint initiates
criminal proceedings. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5442, commentary (1958).
In Vermont, no official commencement point is set down but, interestingly, the law
provides for assistance of counsel whenever an individual has been detained. Detention is
defined as to "have in custody or otherwise deprive of freedom of action." VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 5201, 5231 (Supp. 1972).
Of course, state rules of procedure cannot authoritatively determine constitutional
principles.
288The term "lineup" implies a formal identification session at which a witness
attempts to identify a suspect from a group, whereas a "showup" can be an informal
confrontation between witness and suspect alone. See generally United States v. Roth, 430
F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971) (Wade applies to informal, as
well as formal, confrontations).
289 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S, 218,228 (1967).
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fled by two witnesses as a participant in a West Hartford, Connecticut,
drug store robbery. It would seem clear that since the identifications
occurred prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, 290
Saltys was not entitled to assistance of counsel. The Second Circuit
stated, however, that
it is arguable that Wade and Gilbert still would require counsel at
the viewings here, even within the limitations of Kirby... .291
The court did not indicate how it would distinguish Kirby but
proceeded to restate the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall "critical stage" test and
apply it to the case at bar. Since the witnesses testified at the trial that
they had previously identified the petitioner, the Second Circuit de-
clared that their testimony should have been automatically excluded.292
Considering the fact that the identification testimony was the only
evidence against the petitioner connecting him with the crime, the
court held that the failure of Saltys' counsel to object to the admission
of the testimony or, at the very least, to request a Wade hearing con-
stituted "woefully inadequate" representation. 293
Chief Judge Friendly, in a strong dissent severely criticized the
290 Whether the arrest and detention of Saltys had advanced past the threshold at
which adversary judicial proceedings commence is not clear from the record. See 465 F.2d
at 1030 (Friendly, C.J., dissenting). It is certain that Saltys had not yet been arraigned on
the unrelated charge, but it is unclear whether his arrest was preceded by the filing of an
information. By comparison of the date of arrest (late February) and the date of the view-
ing (March 13), it is not unreasonable to conclude that formal charges had been instituted
in the unrelated robbery.
291 465 F.2d at 1026. The court cited United States v. Roth, 430 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971), in support of this proposition. However, Roth was con-
cerned only with post-indictment confrontations. See id. at 1140.
292 465 F.2d at 1028. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967), for a state-
ment of the exclusionary rule.
293 At the state trial, which took place after the Supreme Court's decision in Wade
and Gilbert, but before Kirby, petitioner's attorney failed to object to the in-court iden-
tification as arising from illegally conducted viewings. In light of the objection and argu-
ments which his attorney could have made on Wade and Gilbert grounds, the Second
Circuit held that the failure to do so constituted inadequate representation of counsel.
465 F.2d at 1028-29. See United States v. Currier, 405 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 914 (1969):
Where inadequacy of counsel is alleged, the courts have established stringent
requirements. Relief may only be obtained when representation has been so woe-
fully inadequate "as to shock the conscience of the Court and make the proceed-
ings a farce and mockery of justice."
405 F.2d at 1043, quoting United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 950 (1950). The Currier court explained that
Errorless counsel is not required, and before we may vacate a conviction there
must be a "total failure to present the cause of the accused in any fundamental
respect."
405 F.2d at 1043, quoting United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1963). Ap-




majority for their alleged failure to follow the Kirby precedent.29 4
While conceding that the result might have been correct had this
appeal been decided pre-Kirby, the Chief Judge argued that since such
was not the case, the petitioner had no right to habeas corpus under
the Habeas Corpus Act.295 The Act, he noted, requires that, in order
to secure review, the petitioner must present a bona fide claim that he
is being held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." 296 In the Chief Judge's opinion, the pe-
titioner's counsel cannot now be faulted for failing to object to testi-
mony elicited before the commencement of an adversary judicial
proceeding "on the basis of what was then thought to be the law ...
although, as we now know [in light of Kirby], wrongly sO."297 The
petition should, therefore, be denied, the Chief Judge declared, as
Saltys is not, under the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement,
"in custody in violation of the Constitution." 298
In Judge Friendly's view, the issue squarely presented in Saltys
is whether Kirby is to apply retroactively to bar assertion of grounds
for habeas corpus relief based on the law as it existed under Wade-
Gilbert-Stovall.299 Any attempt to apply Kirby retroactively flies di-
rectly in the face of Stovall v. Denno300 which specifically denied re-
294 465 F.2d at 1031.
29528 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1971).
2901d.
297 465 F.2d at 1031 (dissenting opinion).
298 Id.
299 Prior- to Kirby, five states refused to apply Wade-Gilbert-Stovall to pre-indictment
confrontations. See State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1971); Buchanan v. Common-
wealth, 210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970); State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964
(1969); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969); People v. Palmer, 41 II. 2d 571, 244
N.E2d 173 (1969).
However, 13 states and every federal court of appeals which considered the matter
found that Wade-Gilbert-Stoval did apply to pre-indictment confrontations. See Wilson
v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972); Virgin Islands v. Collwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3d
Cir. 1971) (dictum); United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193. (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cooper v.
Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (Ist Cir. 1970); United States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1971)
(dictum); United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum); Long v. United
States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1969); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356
Mass. 591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738
(1970); In re Holley, 268 A.2d 723 (R.I. 1970); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d -
(1970); People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); Thompson v.
State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704 (1969); Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash. 2d 80, 455 P.2d 943 (1969); State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18,
215 So. 2d 838 (1968); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968); People v. Hutton,
21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265
N.E.2d 327 (1970); Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969).
800 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall the Court gave three criteria to guide resolution
of the question of retroactvity:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards,
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troactive application of Wade-Gilbert on virtually the same critical
facts as found in Kirby.8 '1 If, then, Kirby is not to be applied retro-
actively, Saltys' detention was clearly in violation of the Constitution
and the law as it existed at the time of his trial.
The Second Circuit's displeasure with Kirby is manifestly evident
in the majority's frequent approving citations to Wade-Gilbert and its
repeated references to Justice Brennan's vigorous Kirby dissent.302
While the court of appeals cannot directly refuse to follow the Supreme
Court's ruling, it may have set a precedent for distinguishing Kirby in
personal identification cases. Given the critical nature of personal
identification confrontations, especially, as often is the case, when the
identification is the sole evidence connecting the accused with the
commission of a crime, 3°3 the reluctance of the Second Circuit to en-
thusiastically embrace Kirby is clearly understandable.
PERJURY- LIE BY NEGATIVE IMPLICATION
United States v. Bronston
Perjury, under federal law, is defined as the knowing and wilful
giving of a materially false statement in a judicial proceeding under
oath.304 The elements of the crime are: a lawfully administered oath, a
(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old stan-
dards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the
new standards.
Id. at 297. However, the Court was concerned with the retroactive application of a
liberalizing decision; retroactive application of a narrowing criminal law decision is
usually rendered unnecessary by double jeopardy considerations. See generally pp. 237-40
& n.13 supra.
301 In both cases, the confrontation occurred before the commencement of adversary
criminal proceedings. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 295 (1967).
302 465 F.2d at 1027-28.
303 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1972, at 1, col. 3. Lawrence Berson was arrested on
charges of rape and was released on bail. Several days later, he was picked up for the rape
of a fourth woman and was sent to Rikers Island House of Detention. Eyewitness testimony
of the victims was the sole evidence against Berson. After 11 days in the house of detention,
he was released when the police arrested one Richard Carbone who confessed to the crimes
that Berson allegedly committed. Upon comparison, the two looked startlingly alike.
Oklahoma has recognized the critical nature of identification confrontations conducted
prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings by providing attorneys at all
such instances. See Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1972).
304Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to
be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly . . . wilfully
and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does
not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury ...
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970). This section replaced § 5392 Revised Statutes which, in turn,
had replaced various perjury statutes adopted from the common law. See, e.g., BLACK-
srorNE's COMMErNrAlUs 808 (B. Gavit ed. 1941).
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